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MENTAL STIMULUS AND DISABILITY UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The right of an injured employee to recover under the Workmen's
Compensation Acts for a mental disability resulting from an acci-
dent sustained in the course of employment has been a perplexing
problem since these statutes were first enacted. The cases dealing with
this problem fall into three categories: (i) A physical accident or
trauma produces a mental injury or disorder-the courts have uni-
formly held that compensation may be awarded for the resulting
mental disability' even though the physical trauma is only slight or
trivial.2 (2) A mental stimulus, e.g., mental shock or fright, results
in the death of the employee 3 or produces a distinct physical injury4-
the great majority of jurisdictions have awarded compensation even
though no physical impact or trauma occurred.5 (3) A mental stimulus
produces a mental disability-within this area the greatest conflict
'Campana v. Hogan, 7 App. Div. 2d 815, i8o N.Y.S.2d 1005 (3d Dep't 1958);
Chicklowski v. Hotel Syracuse, 5 App. Div. 2d 704, 168 N.Y.S.2d 641 (3 d Dep't 1957);
Griffiths v. Shaffery, 283 App. Div. 839, 129 N.Y.S.2d 74 (3 d Dep't 1954); Underwood
v. Whitney, 282 App. Div. 783, 122 N.Y.S.2d 468 (3d Dep't 1953); Wallace v. Bell
Aircraft Corp., 276 App. Div. 800, 93 N.Y.S.2d 162 (3d Dep't 1949); Kalikoff v. John
Lucas & Co., 271 App. Div. 942, 67 N.Y.S.2d 153 (3 d Dep't 1947); Rodriguez v. New
York Dock Co., 256 App. Div. 875, 9 N.Y.S.2d 264 (3d Dep't 1939); 1 Larson, Work-
men's Compensation § 42.22 (1952) [Hereinafter cited as Larson].
'In Kalikoff v. John Lucas & Co., 271 App. Div. 942, 67 N.Y.S.2d 153 (3d Dep't
1947), claimant was bitten by a cat and developed such a fear of being stricken with
rabies that he.became psycho-neurotic. See generally, 5 Schneides, Workmen's Com-
pensation Text § 14110946).
'New York: NVachsstock v. Skyview Transp. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 1028, 173
N.Y.S.2d 405 (3d Dep't 1958); Krawczyk v. Jefferson Hotel, 278 App. Div. 731, 103
N.Y.S.2d 40 (3d Dep't 1951); Church v. Westchester County, 253 App. Div. 859, 1
N.Y.S.2d 581 (3d Dep't 1938); Thompson v. City of Binghamton, 218 App. Div. 451,
218 N.Y. Supp. 355 (3d Dep't 1926).
Other Jurisdiction: Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 380, 232 P.2d 975 ('951);
Johnson v. Zurick Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 161 So. 667 (La. App. 1935); Monk
v. Charcoal Iron Co., 246 Mich. 193, 224 N.W. 354 (1929); Klein v. Len H. Darling
Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922); Liscio v. S. Makransky & Sons, 147 Pa. Super.
84, 24 A.2d 136 (1942); 1 Larson § 42.21.
4Paralysis: Miller v. Bingham County, 31o P.2d 1o89 (Idaho 1957); J. Norman
Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md. 165, 19o Atl. 836 (1937); Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694,
75 N.E.2d 511 (1947); Insurance Dep't v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691
(1958); Schuster v. Perryman Elec. Co., ii N.J. Misc. 16, 163 Ad. 437 (Dep't Labor
1932). Heart Attack: Pukaluk v. Insurance Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 676, 179 N.YS.2d 173
(3d Dep't 1958); Pickrell v. Schumacker, 215 App. Div. 745, 212 N.Y. Supp. 897
(3d Dep't 1925), aff'd meM., 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926).
5See notes 3 & 4 supra. Accord, i Larson § 42.21; 99 C. J. S. Workmen's Compen-
sation § i68(b) (1958); 9 Ark. L. Rev. 185, 186 (1955); 41 Va. L. Rev. 824 (1955)-
CASE COMMENTS
exists.6 The New York Supreme Court was recently confronted with
a case in this controversial third category in Chernin v. Progress
Service Co.
7
The claimant in Chernin, a taxi driver, hit a pedestrian who darted
in front of his taxi. The accident knocked the pedestrian unconscious
but caused no physical injury to the taxi driver. He did, however, be-
come emotionally disturbed immediately following the accident and
was later admitted to Bellevue Hospital suffering from a mental dis-
order. The Workmen's Compensation Board conceded that claimant
had suffered no physical injury, but awarded him compensation for
his resulting mental disability. The Board found that the excitement
surrounding the accident aggravated a pre-existing emotional dis-
order resulting in schizophrenia, paranoid type.8 The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that claimant's mental disability was not compensable
under the compensation act since no physical cause or injury was in-
volved.
Before dealing with the problem presented in Chernin, it is well
to consider the purpose of the statutes under which these cases arise.
Workmen's Compensation Acts provide compensation to employees or
their dependents when such employees are injured, disabled or killed
as a result of an injury incurred in the course of employment. 9 The
courts have often said that the acts are remedial in nature and should
be liberally construed.'0 Thus, any doubt as to the right of a disabled
employee to receive compensation should be resolved in favor of the
ONearly all writers advocate the allowance of compensation. However, there are
relatively few cases reported where the disability is only mental and is produced solely
by mental stimuli. Most of the cases cited in support of an allowance of compensa-
tion involve some additional element, e.g., a physical impact or trauma producing
a mental disorder, or a mental stimulus that results in death, paralysis, or other dis-
tinct physical injury. Annot., 1o9 A.L.R. 892 (1937); Horovitz, Injury and Death
Under Workmen's Compensation Laws 75 (1944); 1 Larson § 42.23; 5 Schneider,
Workmen's Compensation Text § 1411 (1946); Horovitz, The Litigious Phase:
"Arising out of" Employment, 4 NACCA L.J. ig, 68 (1949); 9 Ark. L. Rev. 185, 186
(1955); 5 Catholic U.L. Rev. 118, 120 (1955); 47 Ky. L.J. 437, 449 (1959); 53 Mich. L.
Rev. 898 (1955); 16 Ohio St. L. J. 287, 289 (1955); 2 So. Tex. L.J. 93 (1955); 34 Texas
L. Rev. 496 (1956); 41 Va. L. Rev. 824, 825 (1955).
-9 App. Div. 2d 170. 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dep't 1959).
"[A] pre-existing weakness in the form of a neurotic tendency does not lessen
the compensability of an injury which precipitates a disabling neurosis." i Larson §
42.22.
OIn the Matter of Petrie, 215 N.Y. 335, 1O9 N.E. 549, 550 (1915); 1 Larson § i.oo.
101n the Matter of Petrie, supra note 9; Security Union Ins. Co. v. McClurkin, 35
S.W. 2d 240, 243 (rex. Civ App. 193o). See New York cases cited in 3 Schneider,
Workmen's Compensation Statutes 2391 (i939).
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employee." The acts create a right to compensation entirely separate
and distinct from the usual common law tort and contract actions, 2
and most of the confusion in the interpretation of the acts has resulted
from the failure of the courts to recognize this distinction. 3
In Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co.,14 the leading American case
awarding compensation to an employee for a mental disability pre-
cipitated by a mental cause, the Texas Supreme Court recognized this
distinction and placed a liberal construction on the Texas Workmen's
Compensation Act. Claimant received a severe nervous shock when
one end of a scaffold, on which he and a co-employee were working,
collapsed. The co-worker fell to his death, and claimant was saved from
a similar fate when he became entangled in the supporting cables.
Thereafter claimant was unable to return to his usual work because of
a nervous condition. Neurosurgeons testified that the nervous shock
had disrupted the functioning of claimant's nervous system but no
damage had resulted to the physical structure of the system. The
Texas Act provided that "'personal injury' shall be construed to mean
damage or harm to the physical structure of the body. ..."15 In award-
ing compensation, the court said that claimant was just as disabled as
one who suffered a direct physical injury. The feature that makes
this decision so outstanding is the liberal construction the court placed
on the statute. The court stated:
"The phrase 'physical structure of the body,' as it is used in
the statute, must refer to the entire body, not simply to the
skeletal structure or to the circulatory system or to the digestive
system.
"This interference with use or control in an organism whose
good health depends upon unified action and balanced synthe-
sis can be productive of the same disabling signs and symptoms
as direct physical injury to the cells, tissues, organs or organ
systems."16
"Jones v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 223 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949);
Security Union Ins. Co. v. McClurkin, supra note lo; 2 So. Tex. L.J. 93, 95 (1956);
34 Texas L. Rev. 496, 498 (1956).
"Winfield v. New York Cent. & H. R. R.R., 216 N.Y. 284, 1iuo N.E. 614, 616 (1915);
Horovitz, Injury and Death Under Workmen's Compensation Laws 8, 9 (1944); 1
Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text § 6 (1941, Supp. 1958).
"3"Almost every major error that can be observed in the development of compen-
sation law, whether judicial or legislative, can be traced ... to the importation of
tort ideas.... " iLarson § 1.2o at 2-3.
14154 Tex, 430, 279 S.W.,d 315 (1955).
"279 S.W.2d at 3M18.
6Id. at 318-19.
CASE COMMENTS
Another leading case awarding compensation in a situation similar
to that in Chernin was the English case of Yates v. South Kirkly & Col-
lieries, Ltd.17 The claimant, a collier, was working in a mine when
he discovered a fellow collier who had been injured by a fallen prop.
Claimant carried the fatally injured collier from the mine, and as a
result suffered a disabling nervous shock. In granting compensation,
Lord Justice Farwell stated that "nervous shock due to accident which
causes personal incapacity to work is as much 'personal injury by ac-
cident' as a broken leg ... is
From the above discussion it can be seen that leading American
and English cases dealing with the problem have awarded compensa-
tion to the disabled employee. Cases denying compensation may be
distinguished on the following grounds: the court failed to face the
essential issue and based its decision on a secondary point;1 9 the
court applied tort reasoning in construing the compensation statute;
20
or the court strictly construed the compensation statute. A case demon-
strating this latter ground is Bekeleski v. 0. F. Neal Co. 21 There the
claimant was trapped for thirty minutes in an elevator with a dying
man. Claimant's nervous system suffered such a severe shock that she
'[191o 2 K.B. 538.
1"Id. at 542. Two other often cited opinions allowing compensation should also
be mentioned. In Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291
(1941), a short circuit occurred in a motor near claimant resulting in a flash and
loud noise. Claimant became frightened and started to fall but was caught by a
co-worker. Later, whenever claimant saw the co-worker again she was reminded of
the explosion and fainted. She was unable to continue her work. In affirming an
award of compensation the court stated: "As a result of the accident and injury
[claimant] ... was incapacitated for work. Her incapacity was as effectual as if
it had been caused by visible lesion." Id. at 294.
In Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446 (Hudson
County Ct. 1953), aff'd, 26 N.J. Super. 535, 98 A.2d 605 (1953), a steampipe burst
causing a violent explosion. Claimant received a nervous shock therefrom that re-
sulted in a functional neuropsychiatric disorder. In awarding compensation the
court stated: "[Tjhe statutory basis for a compensation award is an 'injury,' and
there is nothing in the law to exclude from the import of this term such injuries from
non-physical, that is, psychic, trauma." 95 A.2d at 45o.
101n Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Atl, 334 (N.J. Dep't Labor 1936), claimant
suffered a "nervous spell" after a co-worker called her an "idiot." The court decided
this derogatory remark was not an accident arising out of the course of employment.
In Shivers v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 75 Ga. App. 409, 43 S.E.2d 429 (1947), claimant
alleged his nervous collapse was caused by an explosion and constant fear of re-
curring explosion. The court felt that no explosion had occurred and that the
claimant's nervous state was caused by other events not connected with his em-
ployment.
n'Chernin v. Progress Serv. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3 d Dep't
'959).
=141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
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became' totally disabled. The court, in strictly construing a statute
similar to the one in Bailey,2 2 denied compensation on the ground
that there was no violence to the physical structure of the body. How-
ever, a strong dissent, cited with approval in later cases, advocated an
interpretation of the statute similar to the liberal construction ren-
dered by the majority in Bailey.
23
Since the leadifg cases dealing with the problem have awarded
compensation, the question remains as to the basis for the Supreme
Court's denial of compensation in Chernin. It is apparent that the
court faced the issue in Chernin, but it is submitted that it erred by
applying tort concepts and in strictly construing the New York Com-
pensation Act, as is evidenced by the implication that recovery would
have been allowed if either of two additional factors were present:
(i) claimant had received a physical impact and a resulting mental
disorder; or (2) claimant had suffered a true physical injury.
As a basis for the requirement of physical impact, the court stated
that it found "nothing in the law that connotes purely excessive emo-
tions-anger, grief or other mental feelings-unaccompanied by physical
force or exertion can be the basis of an accident." 24 New York is an
"impact" jurisdiction denying recovery in negligence cases for in-
nNeb. Rev. Stat. § 48-152 (1929): "The term 'injury' and 'personal injury' shall
mean only violence to the physical structure of the body .... " In City Ice and Fuel
Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952), claimant was involved in an automobile
accident in which he received no physical injury. He was unable to resume work
because of a nervous disorder that was diagnosed as conversion hysteria and possible
dementia praecox. The court felt that claimant's condition resulted from worry
over his financial status, rather than from the accident, and thus did not arise out
of the course of his employment. The statutory definition of injury precluded the
claimant from a compensation award even if the disability had arisen out of his
employment. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.02 (1949): "A mental or nervous injury due to
fright or excitement only. . shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident
arising out of the employment."
n"I am inclined to think that the lawmakers, by the use of the term 'violence
to the physical structure of the body,' meant an animate body with a directing brain
containing blood, sensitive nerves, fibers and convolutions. The brain is part of the
physical structure of the body. Without it there could be no performance of an
employee's duties. Accidential violence to the brain and resulting disability may
be difficult to prove, but plaintiff was rational before the accident and irrational
afterward." Bekeleski v. 0. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.WA.2d 741, 744 (1942).
The Idaho court, in construing a violence to the physical structure of the body
statute similar to Nebraska's, had this to say about the Bekeleski case: "We think
the dissent is more scientifically reasoned and more worthy of our acceptance ... "
Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 38o, 232 P.2d 975, 980 (1951). The Bekeleski dis-
sent was again cited with approval in Miller v. Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87, 310
P.2d 1089, 1093 (1957).
4'192 N.YS.2d at 760. (Emphasis added.)
CASE COMMENTS
juries resulting from fright unless there is a physical shock or impact.25
The physical force requirement imposed by the court is obviously
an infiltration of tort law into the workmen's compensation field, con-
trary to the rule as stated by leading authorities.
2 6
The physical injury requirement is indicated by the following
statement from the court's opinion: "While it may accurately be
claimed the facts would be sufficient to sustain the Board if the in-
jury were of a physical nature, we find the present facts not com-
pensable under the law.' 27 In requiring a physical injury the court
strictly construed the statute and placed a gloss on it that its plain
words will not bear. The statute provides that "'injury' and 'personal
injury' mean only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course
of employment and such diseases or infection as may naturally ... re-
sult thereform." 2s Clearly there is nothing on its face that excludes
mental injuries or disorders. "Personal injury" is normally defined
under the compensation acts as any harm or damage to the health of
the employee,29 and to draw a distinction between physical and mental
harm or damage seems unjustified.
In concluding, the court recognized that it might "logically be
2Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); McNiece, Psychic
Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 22 (1949). The New
York impact doctrine has influenced other workmen's compensation cases. A school
janitor, greatly excited in trying to turn off a fire alarm, suffered a heart attack
and died therefrom. The majority affirmed an award of compensation to his ex-
ecutor. Judge Kellogg, in a dissenting opinion, thought such an award violated the
impact rule since the janitor had sustained no physical impact or injury. He stated:
"The question was one of proximate cause. Surely if, in a negligence case, no causal
relation can be found between an accident and damages caused by pure fright, no
such relation can be discovered, where the facts are the same, in a workmen's com-
pensation case." Thompson v. City of Binghamton, 218 App. Div. 451, 218 N.Y.
Supp. 355, 358 (3 d Dep't 1926). But see Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d
249 (1958), for a weakening of the impact rule.
-i Larsen § 1.20, 2.10, 3.40; 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Text § 6
(1941, SUpp. 1958). This rule was correctly stated in Elihinger v. Wolf House Furnish-
ing Co., 230 Mo. App. 648, 72 S.W.2d 144, 148 (1934): "Principles of law and de-
ductions therefrom which might have been applicable under the old relationship of
master and servant, as well as refinements of legal principles applicable to other
relationships under the general law, both statutory and common, even though con-
veniently analogous, have no application in cases where ... the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law provides a clear and unambiguous definition and prescribes a com-
plete rule to govern in the field of its operation. We must, therefore, carefully avoid
applying to cases within the Workmen's Compensation Law reasonings and prin-
ciples which formerly might have been proper as bases of decision, but which,
since the passage of that act, are no longer applicable to such cases."
'-192 N.Y.S.2d at 76o. (Emphasis added.)
'N.Y. Workmen's Comp. § 2(7).
!Black, Law Dictionary 925 (4 th ed. ig5i).
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argued that claimant here is just as disabled as someone suffering
from a physical disability," but stated that claimant's accident "does
not, at present, constitute an accident as defined by the Workmen's
Compensation Law."3 0 Since the purpose of compensation acts is to
give compensation to employees disabled in the course of employment,
it seems that if an employee is in fact disabled, the cause of such dis-
ability should be immaterial. The remedial compensation laws are
to be liberally construed, with doubts resolved in favor of the claimant.
In making compensation depend on the cause of the disability, the
court is strictly construing the statute, with the result that a workman
suffering from a broken leg will be awarded compensation, whereas
a workman hospitalized with schizophrenia will be denied similar
benefits, though both are in fact disabled.
Even if this strict construction requiring a physical injury is cor-
rect, there is medical authority to the effect that schizophrenia is a
physical injury in the sense that the physical body no longer functions
normally.3 ' The nervous system is a distinct part of the physical body,
and mental or emotional shock produces a definite impact on this sys-
tem, which impact may produce physical harm and injury.3 2 "In fact,
it may be broadly stated that an emotion as a purely mental thing
does not exist. It always has a physical side."33 To make compensation
depend on definitions of what is physical and what is mental seems
unrealistic.
34
In Chernin the court, undoubtedly influenced by the belief that
mental disorders are easily simulated, was afraid that allowing compen-
sation would open the gates to a flood of fictitious claims. Although this
line of reasoning may have been valid in the past, today "skilled medi-
cal men have developed a technique for distinguishing the real suf-
ferer from the fraudulent imposter." 35 Furthermore, the fact that
compensation cases are tried before a referee who hears many such
claims affords additional protection against the danger of exaggera-
tion and malingering.
Mental disabilities resulting from mental stimuli could be made
30192 N.Y.S.2d at 76o.
3'Coon, Pyschiatry for the Lawyer: The Principal Psychoses, 31 Cornell L.Q.
327, 336 (1946).
'2Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497,
507 (1922).
3Id. at 5o.
31 Larson § 42.23 (Supp. 1959); Mich. L. Rev. 898, goo (1955); 16 Ohio St. L.J.
287, 290 (1955)_
"Goodrich, Emotional Disturbances as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 505
(1922).
